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The years since the mid-1970's have produced an age dis-
crimination plaintiff different in noteworthy respects from the
person Congress and President Johnson contemplated in au-
tumn 1967,1 when the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act ("ADEA")2 was passed and signed into law. While
ADEA's proponents were primarily concerned with the hiring
barriers older workers faced, ADEA actions have tended to
arise more often from termination, layoff or demotion.3 This
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1. Although the evidence is far from crystal clear, both Congress and President
Johnson seemed most concerned about lower-paid and nonmanagerial workers when
considering age discrimination. Discussion of age discrimination in the labor market
was laced with references to elderly workers on welfare or below the poverty level. See
President Johnson's Special Message to the Congress Proposing Programs for Older
Americans, 12 PuB. PAPERS 32 (Jan. 23, 1967); 110 CONG. REc. 2598 (1964) (state-
ment of Rep. Pucinski). While Congress was considering amending the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 to include age, there was discussion of the "prerogatives of management",
id. (statement of Rep. Roosevelt), and the effect of automation on older workers. U.S.
DEP'T. OF LABOR, THE OLDER AMERICAN WORKER: AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EM-
PLOYMENT (1965); 110 CONG. REC. 13,491 (1964) (statement of Sen. Long); 110 CONG.
REC. at 2598 (statement of Rep. Pucinski). The heavy involvement of the Department
of Labor in reporting on the problems of age discrimination may itself be indicative of a
focus on workers traditionally classified as laborers. See 29 U.S.C. § 622 (1982). The
Department of Labor's 1965 report was prepared pursuant to section 715 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.
2. Age Discrimination in Employment Act Pub. L. No. 90-202, §§ 2-17, 81 Stat.
602 (1967) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 621-634 (West 1985)).
3. See President Johnson's Special Message, supra note 1, at 37; U.S. DEP'T. OF
LABOR, THE OLDER AMERICAN WORKER, supra note 1; 110 CONG. REC. 2597 (1964)
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phenomenon persists, and furthermore, the pool of laid off or
discharged workers seems to have changed composition.
Once layoffs were principally a rank and file worry, often rela-
tively brief and, insofar as they were governed by a labor con-
tract's seniority provisions, usually without a disproportionate
effect on older workers. While not unheard of, cutbacks in
managerial or executive staff resulting in ADEA litigation
were rare before the latter half of the past decade.
As layoffs have in recent years taken on a more ominously
permanent form, and often sliced deep into white collar lay-
ers, an archetypal age discrimination plaintiff has emerged.
He - and it usually is a man - is often near the upper end of
the protected age bracket,4 and is frequently a middle or upper
level manager.5 He is not a worker governed by strict senior-
ity rules. Typically, he comes from a relatively small group of
discharged employees, and accordingly presses his claim indi-
vidually or in small numbers, although there are significant
exceptions.6 And perhaps most notably, from the standpoint
of age discrimination, he has not been replaced by a younger
(statement of Rep. Pucinski); Statement by the President After Signing the Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act of 1967, 12 PUB. PAPERS 1154 (Dec. 16, 1967). Both
Congress and the executive branch were responding to statistics showing that older
workers endured longer periods of unemployment after losing a job than younger
workers.
4. See Tice v. Lampert Yards, Inc., 761 F.2d 1210 (7th Cir. 1985) (57-year old);
EEOC v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 725 F.2d 211 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 92
(1984) (65 affected workers 55 and over); Hedrick v. Hercules, Inc., 658 F.2d 1088 (5th
Cir. 1981) (61-year old); Thornbrough v. Columbus & G.R.R., 760 F.2d 633 (5th Cir.
1985) (56-year old); Grubb v. W.A. Foote Memorial Hosp., Inc., 741 F.2d 1486 (6th
Cir. 1984) (61-year old).
5. See, e.g., Thornbrough v. Columbus & G.R.R., 760 F.2d 633 (5th Cir. 1985)
(vice-president); LaGrant v. Gulf & W. Mfg. Co., 748 F.2d 1087 (6th Cir. 1984) (man-
ager of administrative services); Hedrick v. Hercules, Inc., 658 F.2d 1088 (5th Cir.
1981) (plant manager); Stanojev v. Ebasco Services, Inc., 643 F.2d 914 (2d Cir. 1981)
(vice-president for special assignments); Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003 (1st Cir.
1979)(international sales manager). Note also that 29 U.S.C. § 631(c) (1982 & Supp. II
1984), added in 1978 and amended in 1984, kept the original age 65 cap on ADEA
protection for employees in bona fide executive or high policymaking positions. If our
admittedly informal empirical observations regarding typical age discrimination plain-
tiffs are correct, then an increasing percentage of potential plaintiffs face a de facto
cutoff of ADEA protection at age 65, pursuant to section 63 1(c), instead of age 70.
6. See, e.g., Matthews v. Allis-Chalmers, 769 F.2d 1215 (7th Cir. 1985); Massarsky
v. General Motors Corp., 706 F.2d 111 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 937 (1983);
EEOC v. Sandia Corp., 639 F.2d 600 (10th Cir. 1980); Mistretta v. Sandia Corp., 639
F.2d 588 (10th Cir. 1980).
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worker; in fact, he has not been replaced, in the narrow sense
of the word, at all. Rather, employers have truncated por-
tions of their operations and reduced forever the size of their
work force. The term "reduction in force," or "RIF," will be
used to describe this modern hybrid of the layoff.
This article first skims the ADEA topography, providing a
summary overview of that Act. It next discusses the two basic
approaches to establishing and rebutting an age discrimina-
tion case, the disparate impact and disparate treatment theo-
ries. The article then turns to the problems that the modern
RIF has created for courts as they seek to apply the tradi-
tional ADEA disparate treatment analysis. The traditional
analysis includes a four element prima facie case, the fourth
element requiring a plaintiff to show he was replaced by an
employee outside the protected group or by a substantially
younger employee, or that the employer sought others with
similar qualifications to do the same work. Such a showing is
usually impossible in the RIF context. Accordingly, this arti-
cle will address the proper formulation in the RIF context of
the fourth element needed to establish an inference of age
discrimination.
I. OVERVIEW OF THE ADEA's SUBSTANTIVE PROVISIONS
The ADEA, as amended,7 is the principal federal law
prohibiting age discrimination.8 It forbids age discrimination
7. The original Act was amended by Pub. L. No. 93-259, 88 Stat. 74 (1974); Pub L.
No. 95-256, 92 Stat. 189-93 (1978); Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 353 (1982); Pub. L. No.
98-369, 98 Stat. 1063 (1984); and Pub. L. No. 98-459, 98 Stat. 1792 (1984). The Age
Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978 raised the permissible
mandatory retirement age from 65 to 70 for most private sector employees.
8. Age Discrmination Act of 1975 ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6101-6107 (1982) ex-
tends the prohibitions against age discrimination to programs or activities receiving fed-
eral financial assistance. Id. at § 6102. It does not amend or otherwise modify the
ADEA. Id. § 6103(c)(2). The ADA is applicable only to a public service employment
program or activity receiving federal financial assistance under the Job Training Part-
nership Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1781 (1982), 42 U.S.C. § 6103(c) (1982).
Exec. Order No. 11,141, 3 C.F.R. 179 (1964), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 3301 app. at
517 (1982), declares the federal executive branch's policy prohibiting federal contractors
and subcontractors from discriminating against employees and job applicants on the
basis of age. It does not specify a protected age group. It contains exceptions for bona
fide occupational qualifications, retirement plans and statutory requirements. The Of-
fice of Federal Contract Compliance Programs ("OFCCP") has issued no regulations
implementing the order, and one federal court has held the order creates no enforceable
1986]
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in employment against workers between forty and seventy
years of age, 9 and applies to public' ° and private employers,"
labor unions12 and employment agencies. 13 All employment
decisions are subject to ADEA scrutiny, including hiring, dis-
charge, demotion, promotion, compensation, and other terms,
conditions or privileges of employment.' 4
There are five principal affirmative defenses to ADEA
claims. An employer may argue that its challenged employ-
ment decision is based upon (1) a bona fide occupational qual-
ification ("BFOQ") reasonably necessary to the normal
operation of the particular business;' 5 (2) a reasonable factor
right of action. See Kodish v. United Airlines, Inc., 463 F. Supp. 1245, 1251-52 (D.
Colo. 1979), affd, 628 F.2d 1301 (10th Cir. 1980).
9. 29 U.S.C. § 631(a) (1982). The 1978 amendments eliminated the upper age limit
for federal employees, with the exception of certain positions for which a mandatory
retirement age had previously been established by other statutes or regulations. Id. at
§§ 631(b), 633a.
10. The ADEA applies to the federal government (with certain procedural and
substantive differences), id. at § 633a, and to state and local government employers. Id.
at § 630(b). See EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983) (the tenth amendment does
not preclude application of the ADEA to state and local governments); accord Arritt v.
Grisell, 567 F.2d 1267, 1269-71 (4th Cir. 1977) (Congress may exercise its powers under
the Constitution to extend the application of the ADEA to the states).
11. The ADEA defines an "employer" as one engaged in an industry affecting com-
merce with 20 or more employees for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar
weeks in the current or preceding calendar year. 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (1982).
12. "Labor organizations" engaged in an industry affecting commerce with 25 or
more members, or operating a hiring hall procuring employees for an employer or work
opportunities with an employer, are covered under the ADEA. Id. at § 630(d) and (e).
Such labor organizations are prohibited from discriminating on the basis of age with
respect to membership or employment opportunities and are further prohibited from
attempting to cause an employer to violate the ADEA. Id. at § 623(c).
13. "Employment agencies" are defined to include any person regularly undertak-
ing (with or without compensation) to procure employees for an employer. Id. at
§ 630(c). Employment agencies are prohibited from discriminating with respect to em-
ployment referrals and are prohibited from classifying or referring job applicants on the
basis of age. Id. at § 623(b).
14. Id. at § 623(a). See B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINA-
TION LAW 485 (2d ed. 1983).
15. 29 U.S.C. § 623(0(1) (1982). In asserting the BFOQ defense, a defendant ad-
mits that age was a determining factor in its challenged employment decision, but ar-
gues it was reasonably necessary to the normal operation of its particular business.
Whether a BFOQ is "reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the particular
business" is determined by examining all pertinent facts. 29 C.F.R. § 1625.6(a) (1985).
The BFOQ exception is narrowly construed, and has a limited scope and applica-
tion. Id. See also EEOC v. City of Janesville, 630 F.2d 1254, 1258 (7th Cir. 1980);
Houghton v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 553 F.2d 561, 564 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 966 (1977). Employers must show that a claimed BFOQ is reasonably necessary to
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other than age ("RFOTA"); 16 (3) a bona fide seniority sys-
tem;17 (4) a bona fide employee benefit plan;1 8 or (5) good
the essence of the particular business operation. 29 C.F.R. § 1625.6(b)(1) (1985). See
Monroe v. United Airlines, Inc., 736 F.2d 394, 400 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S.
Ct. 1356 (1985); Orzel v. City of Wauwatosa Fire Dep't, 697 F.2d 743, 753 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 992 (1983); Arritt v. Grisell, 567 F.2d 1267, 1 271 (4th Cir. 1977);
Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224, 235-36 (5th Cir. 1976). Moreover,
the employer must prove either that it is impossible or impracticable to deal with all
excluded persons on an individualized basis, or that the employer has a factual basis for
believing that all or substantially all excluded persons would be unable to perform the
job duties safely and efficiently. 29 C.F.R. § 1625.6(b) (1985). See Monroe v. United
Airlines, Inc., 736 F.2d 394, 400 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1356 (1985);
Arritt v. Grisell, 567 F.2d at 1271; Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224,
235-36 (5th Cir. 1976).
16. 29 U.S.C. § 623(0(1) (1982). The ADEA permits an employer to differentiate
between employees if "the differentiation is based on reasonable factors other than
age. . . ." Id. The existence of such a differentiating factor must be determined on a
case-by-case basis. 29 C.F.R. § 1625.7(b) (1985). When the defense is used, the em-
ployer has the burden of showing the asserted RFOTA exists factually. Id. at
§ 1625.7(e).
17. 29 U.S.C. § 623(0(2) (1982). The ADEA permits an employer to observe the
terms of a bona fide seniority system "which is not a subterfuge to evade the purposes
of" the Act. Id. The seniority system may be qualified by factors such as merit, capac-
ity, or ability, but length of service must be the primary criterion for allocating work
opportunities and prerogatives among younger and older workers. 29 C.F.R. § 1625.8
(1985). No seniority system may require or permit the involuntary retirement of certain
employees under 70 on the basis of age. 29 U.S.C. § 623(0(2) (1982); 29 C.F.R.
§ 1625.9 (1985).
18. 29 U.S.C. § 623(0(2) (1982). Employers are allowed to observe the terms of a
bona fide employee benefit plan, such as a retirement, pension or insurance plan, if the
plan is not a subterfuge to evade the purposes of the Act. Id. Typically, the cost to an
employer of providing such fringe benefits increases with the age of the covered em-
ployee. Accordingly, this exception allows an employer to provide lower benefits to
older workers if the lower benefits are justified by age-related cost considerations. 29
C.F.R. § 860.120(a)(1), (d) (1985).
An employee benefit plan is considered nondiscriminatory where the actual pay-
ments made or costs incurred on behalf of an older worker equal those made or in-
curred on behalf of a younger worker, even if the result is that the older worker receives
lower benefits or less insurance coverage. Only the employer's cost in providing the
benefits must be approximately the same. Id. Employers, however, must provide em-
ployees with the same level of group health care benefits. 29 U.S.C. § 623(g)(l) (1982).
Benefit equivalence, not just cost equivalence, is required. 29 C.F.R. § 1625.20(a)(1)
(1985).
Significantly, no employee benefit plan can require or permit the involuntary retire-
ment of an individual in the protected age category because of that individual's age. 29
U.S.C. § 623(0(2) (1982). An employee benefit plan may, however, permit individuals
to elect early retirement upon reaching a specified age at their own option. 29 C.F.R.
§ 1625.9(0 (1985). The election must be truly voluntary.
An exception to the prohibition on mandatory retirement exists for employees who
are at least 65 but less than 70 years old, who have held a bona fide executive or high
policymaking position for a two-year period immediately preceding retirement, and who
1986]
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cause. 19 The "BFOQ", "bona fide seniority system" and
"bona fide employee benefit plan" exceptions are true affirma-
tive defenses: the employer acknowledges it discriminated on
the basis of age, but justifies its employment decision under
one of those exceptions. The "RFOTA" and "good cause"
defenses, on the other hand, are asserted when an employer
argues there was no causal connection between its employ-
ment decision and the employee's age; in this sense, they are
not exceptions at all.2"
II. ESTABLISHING DISCRIMINATION: THE DISPARATE
IMPACT AND DISPARATE TREATMENT THEORIES
The ADEA is a hybrid of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 ("Title VII")21 and the Fair Labor Standards Act of
1938 ("FLSA");22 its prohibitions are modeled after Title VII,
while its remedies follow those of the FLSA.23 Courts conse-
quently turn to Title VII cases to interpret ADEA's provi-
sions. 4 Under Title VII, two distinct theories for establishing
are entitled to an immediate nonforfeitable annual retirement benefit of $44,000. 29
U.S.C. § 631(c)(1) (1982). The EEOC states that this exception must be narrowly con-
strued, and claims that it does not apply to federal employees. 29 C.F.R. § 1625.12(b),
(g) (1985). To qualify as a "bona fide executive" the employee must meet the six spe-
cific requirements set forth in 29 C.F.R. § 541.1 (1985).
Formerly, a second exception to the prohibition against compulsory retirement al-
lowed institutes of higher education to mandate retirement of teachers between 65 and
70 who had unlimited tenure. This exemption expired July 1, 1982. Pub. L. No. 95-
256, § 3(a), (b)(3), 92 Stat. 189-90 (1978). See 29 U.S.C. § 631(d) (1976 & Supp. II
1978) (repealed 1978); 29 C.F.R. § 1625.11 (1985).
19. The ADEA does not prevent an employer from discharging or disciplining an
employee for "good cause." 29 U.S.C. § 623(0(3) (1982).
20. SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 14, at 504-05.
21. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e - 2000e-17 (1982).
22. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1982).
23. SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 14, at 485. See also Lorillard v. Pons, 434
U.S. 575, 584 (1978) (the ADEA's substantive prohibitions were derived in haec verba
from Title VII).
24. See Douglas v. Anderson, 656 F.2d 528, 531-32 (9th Cir. 1981); Loeb v. Tex-
tron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1015-16 (1st Cir. 1979); Schwager v. Sun Oil Co., 591 F.2d
58, 62 (10th Cir. 1979). One significant difference between the two acts is that the
ADEA, unlike Title VII, accords a plaintiff the right to trial by jury. 29 U.S.C.
§ 626(c)(2) (1982).
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unlawful discrimination have emerged: disparate impact25
and disparate treatment.26
A. The Disparate Impact Theory
Under the disparate impact theory, a plaintiff is initially
required to prove, most commonly through statistics, that an
employer's facially neutral rule or policy has a disparate im-
pact upon the employment opportunities of a protected class
of persons.27 Once disparate impact is demonstrated, the bur-
den of going forward shifts to the employer, which must es-
tablish that the rule or policy under challenge is mandated by
"business necessity. ' 28
That the employer is solely motivated by legitimate busi-
ness concerns, and has no intent to discriminate against the
plaintiff or his class, is of no moment under the disparate im-
pact theory.29 "[G]ood intent or absence of discriminatory in-
tent does not redeem employment procedures or testing
mechanisms that operate as 'built-in headwinds' for minority
groups and are unrelated to measuring job capability. 30
If the employer establishes that the challenged rule or pol-
icy is required by "business necessity," a difficult task, the
plaintiff must then show the employer used the rule or policy
as a mere pretext for discrimination. 31 The plaintiff can dis-
credit the "business necessity" defense by demonstrating
either that the employer's evidence is insufficient to establish
25. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977); International Bhd. of
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422
U.S. 405 (1975); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
26. See, eg., Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 579-80 (1978); Mc-
Donnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800-01 (1973).
27. See, eg., Massarsky v. General Motors Corp., 706 F.2d 111, 120 (3d Cir.), cert
denied, 464 U.S. 937 (1983); Leftwich v. Harris-Stowe State College, 702 F.2d 686, 690
(8th Cir. 1983); Allison v. Western Union Tel. Co., 680 F.2d 1318, 1321 (11th Cir.
1982); Geller v. Markham, 635 F.2d 1027, 1032 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S.
945 (1981). See also Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 446 (1982); New York City
Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 584 (1979); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321,
329 (1977); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975).
28. See Massarsky, 706 F.2d at 120; Leftwich, 702 F.2d at 691; Allison, 680 F.2d at
1322; Geller, 635 F.2d at 1032; see also Teal, 457 U.S. at 446-47.
29. See Leftwich, 702 F.2d at 690; Allison, 680 F.2d at 1322; Geller, 635 F.2d at
1031. See also Albemarle Paper Co., 422 U.S. at 422; Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
30. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432.
31. See Massarsky, 706 F.2d at 120; see also Teal, 457 U.S. at 447.
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business necessity, or that an alternative rule or policy exists
that has less disparate impact on the protected group.32
While the disparate impact theory enjoys widespread ac-
ceptance under Title VII, there is little agreement concerning
its applicability to ADEA cases,3 3 and few ADEA cases have
been brought under this theory.34 Part of the reason perhaps
lies in the fact that the disparate impact theory is not easily
transferred to age cases.35
It is difficult, for example, to determine when the degree of
any disparate impact becomes legally significant. The Seventh
Circuit has stated that the statistical disparity in age discrimi-
nation cases must be quite large before discrimination is
shown. Some disparity is always present, and simply reflects
the replacement of older workers by younger workers, as older
workers retire from the labor force.36
Despite this difficulty, some courts have applied the dispa-
rate impact theory to ADEA cases.37 Indeed, a few courts
have expressly found the disparate impact theory applicable.38
Other courts simply utilize the theory without specifically dis-
cussing its applicability.39
32. See Geller, 635 F.2d at 1032; see also Dothard, 433 U.S. at 329; Albemarle, 422
U.S. at 425.
33. See Akins v. South Cent. Bell Tel. Co., 744 F.2d 1133, 1136 (5th Cir. 1984)
(court declines to determine whether disparate impact theory is available in ADEA
cases).
34. SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 14, at 497.
35. See Cunningham v. Central Beverage, Inc., 486 F. Supp. 59, 62-63 (N.D. Tex.
1980).
36. Kephart v. Institute of Gas Technology, 630 F.2d 1217, 1224 (7th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 450 U.S. 959 (1981) (any adverse impact reflected in hiring and promotion
statistics is not legally significant unless it is large enough to factor out the normal
progression of older workers out of the labor market, and their replacement by younger
workers); see also Marshall v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 554 F.2d 730, 735-36 (5th
Cir. 1977) (the replacement of older employees by younger did not raise inference of
improper motive); Laugesen v. Anaconda Co., 510 F.2d 307, 313 (6th Cir. 1975).
37. See, eg., Massarsky v. General Motors Corp., 706 F.2d 111, 117, 120 (3d Cir.),
cerL denied, 464 U.S. 937 (1983); Leftwich v. Harris-Stowe State College, 702 F.2d 686,
690 (8th Cir. 1983).
38. See, e.g., EEOC v. Borden's, Inc., 724 F.2d 1390, 1394-95 (9th Cir. 1984); Gel-
ler v. Markham, 635 F.2d 1027, 1032 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 945 (1981);
cf Akins v. South Cent. Bell Tel. Co., 744 F.2d 1133, 1136 (5th Cir. 1984) (the Fifth
Circuit remanded the case to the district court to consider the disparate impact theory;
the court acknowledged that numerous circuits have concluded the disparate impact
theory is applicable to ADEA suits).
39. See, e.g., Allison, 680 F.2d at 1321-23.
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B. The Disparate Treatment Theory
The second theory developed under Title VII to establish
discrimination, and the theory upon which the balance of this
article centers, is the disparate treatment theory. Unlike the
disparate impact theory, the disparate treatment theory re-
quires a plaintiff to show he was treated differently because of
his membership in a protected class.'
The proof adduced to establish discrimination may be di-
rect, indirect or a combination of both.41 Direct evidence may
consist of discriminatory statements made by an employer or
an undisputed policy that treats employees differently based
on prohibited criteria.42
If an employee can forward direct evidence of unlawful
discrimination, he need not use the three-part burden of proof
scheme set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.43 Usu-
ally, however, there exists little direct evidence of discrimina-
tion. The system of proof developed under Title VII, set forth
in broad outline by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas,
is then available.
The McDonnell Douglas system of proof is based upon the
proposition that an inference of discrimination can be drawn
from the existence of certain objective facts, and that elusive
direct evidence of discriminatory intent is not required. 44 In
brief, the McDonnell Douglas system of proof requires the es-
tablishment of a prima facie case, after which the burden of
production shifts to the employer to demonstrate it had legiti-
mate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its employment decision.
Once such a reason is forwarded (with a modicum of support-
40. 29 U.S.C. § 623 (1982). See Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1017 (5th-
Cir. 1979).
41. See Blackwell v. Sun Elec. Corp., 696 F.2d 1176, 1180 (6th Cir. 1983); Douglas
v. Anderson, 656 F.2d 528, 531 n.2 (9th Cir. 1981).
42. See Loeb, 600 F.2d at 1018 (a plaintiff may rely on direct evidence of discrimi-
natory intent, such as a letter or oral admission by defendant).
43. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See also Blackwell, 696 F.2d at 1180; Loeb, 600 F.2d at
1017-18 (a plaintiff who has introduced direct evidence of discrimination may be enti-
tled to a day in court, without proving each element of the McDonnell Douglas prima
facie case).
44. See, e.g., Massarsky v. General Motors Corp., 706 F.2d 111, 117-18 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 937 (1983); see also Player, Proof of Disparate Treatment Under
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act: Variations on a Title VII Theme, 17 GA. L.
REV. 621, 627 (1983).
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ing evidence), the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to estab-
lish that the reason proffered was merely a pretext disguising
unlawful discrimination. Significantly, at all times the burden
of persuasion rests with the plaintiff.
While some courts have expressed doubt concerning the
applicability of the McDonnell Douglas analysis to ADEA
jury trials, most courts agree that the system of proof devel-
oped in Title VII disparate treatment cases can be applied to
the order, allocation and standards of proof set forth under
the ADEA.45 Courts have been flexible, however, in applying
the McDonnell Douglas model to age cases, modifying it as
circumstances require.46
III. APPLYING THE MCDONNELL DOUGLAS ANALYSIS
TO DISPARATE TREATMENT CASES
UNDER THE ADEA
A. The Prima Facie Case
A prima facie case of age discrimination, in the normal
discharge context, is established by demonstrating by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence the following objective facts:
(a) Plaintiff was in the protected age group;
(b) Plaintiff was qualified;
(c) Plaintiff was discharged or demoted; and
(d) Employer replaced plaintiff with either a person
outside the protected group or a younger employee, or
45. See, e.g., Huhn v. Koehring Co., 718 F.2d 239, 243 (7th Cir. 1983); Pena v.
Brattleboro Retreat, 702 F.2d 322, 323 (2d Cir. 1983); Cuddy v. Carmen, 694 F.2d 853,
857 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Halsell v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 683 F.2d 285, 289 (8th Cir.
1982); Reeves v. General Foods Corp., 682 F.2d 515, 520 (5th Cir. 1982); Douglas v.
Anderson, 656 F.2d 528, 531-32 (9th Cir. 1981); Smith v. University of N.C., 632 F.2d
316, 332-35 (4th Cir. 1980); Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1014-19 (5th Cir.
1979) (McDonnell Douglas formula applies with modifications to ADEA cases).
46. See, e.g., Blackwell v. Sun Elec.Corp., 696 F.2d 1176, 1179 (6th Cir. 1983) (the
court states the McDonnell Douglas guidelines cannot be applied mechanically, but
rather should be applied on a "case-by-case" basis); Smith v. University of N.C., 632
F.2d 316, 333-35 (4th Cir. 1980) (while the McDonnell Douglas system of proof may
appropriately be used in an ADEA jury trial, not all the elements need be recited to the
jury); Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1016-17 (5th Cir. 1979) (McDonnell Doug-
las system must not be used inflexibly in ADEA cases); Laugesen v. Anaconda Co., 510
F.2d 307, 312 (6th Cir. 1975) (it is inappropriate to apply McDonnell Douglas guidelines
inflexibly); see also Furnco Constr. Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978) (the McDon-
nell Douglas guidelines were not intended to be "rigid, mechanized or ritualistic").
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sought someone else with similar qualifications to per-
form the same work.
The second and fourth elements of the prima facie case will be
examined in greater detail.
1. The Second Element of the Prima Facie Case
The second element of a prima facie case of age discrimi-
nation requires proof that the plaintiff met applicable job qual-
ifications, or was performing his job in a manner meeting his
employer's legitimate expectations. 47 In the RIF context, a
plaintiff's job has usually been eliminated, so plaintiff must
prove he was qualified to assume another position at the time
of his demotion or discharge.48
2. The Fourth Element of the Prima Facie Case
The fourth and final element of the prima facie test is the
element over which the most controversy has arisen. Three
formulations of this last element are discernible from case law.
The most stringent formulation requires a plaintiff to
prove he was replaced by a person outside the protected age
group, i.e., the favored person was under the age of forty.g9 A
more lenient standard requires plaintiff only to establish that
he was replaced by a substantially younger employee, who
may himself be in the protected group.5" Courts have not
agreed on how many years' difference constitutes a "substan-
tial" age gap; however, the greater the age difference, the
47. See, eg., Huhn v. Koehring Co., 718 F.2d 239, 243-44 (7th Cir. 1983); Wil-
liams v. General Motors Corp., 656 F.2d 120, 129 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S.
943 (1982); Rodriguez v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231, 1239-40 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
436 U.S. 913 (1978).
48. See, e.g., Allison v. Western Union Tel. Co., 680 F.2d 1318, 1321 (11th Cir.
1982); Williams v. General Motors Corp., 656 F.2d 120, 129 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. de-
nied, 455 U.S. 943 (1982).
49. See, e.g., Anderson v. Savage Laboratories, Inc., 675 F.2d 1221, 1224 (1 th Cir.
1982); Harpring v. Continental Oil Co., 628 F.2d 406, 408 (5th Cir. 1980), cerL denied,
454 U.S. 819 (1981); cf. Williams v. General Motors Corp., 656 F.2d 120, 129 (5th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943 (1982). The EEOC, however, takes the position that
discriminatory employment decisions against persons within the protected age group
are illegal irrespective of whether the person favored by the discrimination is also within
the protected age group. 29 C.F.R. § 1625.2(a) (1985).
50. See, e.g., Cuddy v. Carmen, 694 F.2d 853, 857 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Douglas v.
Anderson, 656 F.2d 528, 533 (9th Cir. 1981); Schwager v. Sun Oil Co., 591 F.2d 58, 61
(10th Cir. 1979).
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stronger the inference of discrimination.51 A still more lenient
formulation requires the plaintiff simply to show that the em-
ployer sought others with similar qualifications to do the same
work. 2 No proof of favoritism towards younger persons is
required.13
In RIF cases, a fourth formulation of this final element is
required. Exactly what this fourth element should be is a mat-
ter of some dispute 4 and the focus of this article.
Once a prima facie showing is made, an inference of age
discrimination arises. 5 The burden of production then shifts
to the employer.
B. Articulation of a Legitimate, Nondiscriminatory Reason
for the Employment Action
If a plaintiff succeeds in making a prima facie showing, the
burden shifts to the employer to "articulate" a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for its action.5 6 The burden to ar-
ticulate requires the defendant to do more than simply deny a
discriminatory intent or motivation; it must articulate a rea-
son, legally sufficient to justify a judgment, and introduce
credible, admissible evidence supporting the existence of the
51. See, e.g., Douglas v. Anderson, 656 F.2d 528, 533 (9th Cir. 1981).
52. See, eg., Tribble v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 669 F.2d 1193, 1196 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1080 (1982); Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1013 (Ist Cir.
1979); Cova v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 574 F.2d 958, 959 (8th Cir. 1978); see also
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1972).
53. See Lovelace v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 681 F.2d 230, 242-43 n.13 (4th Cir.
1982); see also Player, supra note 44, at 644; cf. Smith v. World Book-Childcraft Int'l,
Inc., 502 F. Supp. 96, 99-102 (N.D. Ill. 1980); Moore v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 464 F.
Supp. 357, 360-62 (N.D. Ga. 1979).
54. Compare Duffy v. Wheeling Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 738 F.2d 1393, 1395 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 592 (1984); Douglas, 656 F.2d at 532-33 (in a RIF case, it
makes no sense to require proof of replacement by a younger employee) with Williams,
656 F.2d at 129 (plaintiff must produce evidence, circumstantial or direct, showing his
employer intended to discriminate on the basis of plaintiff's age, in order to establish a
prima facie case).
55. See Lovelace, 681 F.2d at 239; Allison v. Western Union Tel. Co., 680 F.2d
1318, 1322 (11th Cir. 1982).
56. See, eg., Massarsky v. General Motors Corp., 706 F.2d 111, 118 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 937 (1983); Allison v. Western Union Tel. Co., 680 F.2d 1318, 1321
(11 th Cir. 1982); see also McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
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reason. 57 If the employer fails to meet this burden of produc-
tion, the plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 8
The employer is not obliged to prove that the articulated
reason actually motivated its employment action; the burden
of persuasion never shifts to the employer.5 9 Some courts
hold, however, that when an employer asserts certain of the
ADEA's affirmative defenses, it bears a greater burden of
60persuasion.
If the proffered reason is found to exist, the factfinder can
infer it motivated the employer in making the employment de-
cision.61 The burden of production then shifts back to the
plaintiff, and he is left to carry his burden of persuasion.
57. See Horn v. Bibb County Comm'n, 713 F.2d 689, 691 (11th Cir. 1983); Massar-
sky, 706 F.2d at 118; Lovelace v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 681 F.2d 230, 239 (4th Cir.
1982); Allison, 680 F.2d at 1322; see also Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine,
450 U.S. 248, 255 (1981); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 796, 807
(1973).
58. See, eg., Horn v. Bibb County Comm'n, 713 F.2d 689, 691 (11th Cir. 1983);
Cuddy v. Carmen, 694 F.2d 853, 857 n.21 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Allison v. Western Union
Tel. Co., 680 F.2d 1318, 1322 (11th Cir. 1982); see also Texas Dep't of Community
Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981).
59. See, e.g., Blackwel v. Sun Elec. Co., 696 F.2d 1176, 1180 (6th Cir. 1983); Sut-
ton v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 646 F.2d 407, 412 (9th Cir. 1981); Smith v. University of
N.C., 632 F.2d 316, 332-33 (4th Cir. 1980); Carter v. Maloney Trucking & Storage Co.,
631 F.2d 40, 42 (5th Cir. 1980) (only the burden of going forward shifts to defendant
after plaintiff makes out a prima facie case, not burden of proof); Loeb v. Textron, Inc.,
600 F.2d 1003, 1011 (1st Cir. 1979) (burden of persuasion rests at all times with the
plaintiff; the employer has the burden of production to articulate legitimate, nondis-
criminatory reasons for its employment action, not the burden to persuade the trier of
fact that it was in fact motivated by such reason or that such reason was not discrimina-
tory); Marshall v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 576 F.2d 588, 590 (5th Cir. 1978) (risk of
nonpersuasion always remains on plaintiff); see also Texas Dep't of Community Affairs
v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254-56 (1981); Board of Trustees v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24, 25,
29 (1978).
60. See EEOC v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 632 F.2d 1107, 1110 (4th Cir. 1980), cert
denied, 454 U.S. 825 (1981) (burden on employer to provide successful § 623(f)(2) de-
fense); Marshall, 576 F.2d at 591 (an employer has the burden of persuasion if it asserts
the applicability of the BFOQ affirmative defense; in contrast, the "good cause" and
"RFOTA" defenses are not treated as burden-shifting exceptions); Arritt v. Grisell, 567
F.2d 1267, 1271 (4th Cir. 1977); Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224, 236
(5th Cir. 1976).
61. See Loeb, 600 F.2d at 1015 (the inference of discrimination created by the
prima facie case is dispelled after the employer articulates a legitimate, nondiscrimina-
tory reason for its action); see also Furnco Constr. Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 578
(1978).
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C. Plaintiffs Demonstration of Pretext
The plaintiff must respond to the employer's articulation
of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason by presenting evi-
dence showing the employer's stated reason was a pretext for
unlawful discrimination, or not the determinative reason for
the employer's action.62 In doing so, the plaintiff generally in-
troduces additional evidence of illegal motivation that goes be-
yond establishing the bare objective facts needed to make the
prima facie showing.63
Pretext may be demonstrated either by indirect or direct
evidence. The plaintiff may introduce evidence that the em-
ployer had expressed a specific prejudice against members of
the plaintiff's class,64 that similarly situated employees or job
applicants, not members of plaintiff's group, were treated dif-
ferently,65 that established rules or procedures were not uni-
formly applied,6 6 or that plaintiff's relevant abilities or
potential were superior to the person selected or retained.67
Plaintiff may also produce statistical evidence as indirect sup-
port for the inference of improper motivation.68
62. See Duffy v. Wheeling Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 738 F.2d 1393, 1396 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 592 (1984) (plaintiff must directly persuade the court that a
discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer, or indirectly show the em-
ployer's articulated explanation is not credible); Horn v. Bibb County Comm'n, 713
F.2d 689, 691 (l1th Cir. 1983); Massarsky v. General Motors Corp., 706 F.2d 111, 118
(3d Cir. 1983); Allison v. Western Union Tel. Co., 680 F.2d 1318, 1321 (11th Cir.
1982); see also Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).
63. See Reeves v. General Foods Corp., 682 F.2d 515, 521-23 (5th Cir. 1982);
Lovelace v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 681 F.2d 230, 239-40 (4th Cir. 1982). Compare Hal-
sell v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 683 F.2d 285, 291-92 (8th Cir. 1982) (establishment of a
prima facie case of age discrimination does not automatically entitle a plaintiff to a jury
determination on his discrimination claim) with Douglas v. Anderson, 656 F.2d 528,
535 n.7 (9th Cir. 1981) (under proper circumstances, if the employer's rebuttal evidence
is discredited, plaintiffs evidence establishing a prima facie case alone may support a
jury verdict).
64. See Williams v. General Motors Corp., 656 F.2d 120, 130 (5th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 943 (1982) (direct evidence of discriminatory motive, e.g., a document
with a discriminatory notation, would suffice); see also Hatton v. Ford Motor Co., 508
F. Supp. 620, 624 (E.D. Mich. 1981).
65. See Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1014 (1st Cir. 1979); see also Burdine,
450 U.S. at 259; McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804-05 (1973).
66. See, e.g., Anderson v. Savage Laboratories, 675 F.2d 1221, 1224 (11th Cir.
1982).
67. See Michaelis v. Polk Bros., 545 F. Supp. 109, 112 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
68. See, e.g., EEOC v. Sandia Corp., 639 F.2d 600, 621-24 (10th Cir. 1980).
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The crucial factual issue of the employer's motivation is
then joined. The factfinder must examine all the evidence and
determine whether the employment decision was discrimina-
torily motivated.69
Ultimately, a plaintiff must establish by a preponderance
of the evidence that his age was a determining factor in the
adverse employment decision, in the sense that "but for" his
age the adverse action would not have occurred. 70 Age need
not, however, be the sole determining factor.7 1
IV. REDUCTIONS IN FORCE: PROVING A PRIMA FACIE
CASE OF DISPARATE TREATMENT
A. The Problem
A survey of the reported decisions suggests two very basic
observations about reduction in force cases. First, like other
age discrimination cases, they are usually premised on a dispa-
rate treatment theory, as opposed to disparate impact.72 Even
the cases that chronicle heavy reliance on statistical evidence
are generally disparate treatment claims, in which statistics
are calculated more to support an inference about the em-
ployer's motivation than to prove the invidious effect of a
facially neutral policy.73
69. Duffy, 738 F.2d at 1395; Douglas, 656 F.2d at 531 (proof of discriminatory
intent is essential to plaintiff's action).
70. Duffy, 738 F.2d at 1395; Pena v. Brattleboro Retreat, 702 F2d 322, 323 (2d Cir.
1983); Blackwell v. Sun Elec. Corp., 696 F.2d 1176, 1181 (6th Cir. 1983); Cuddy v.
Carmen, 694 F.2d 853, 857-58 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Kephart v. Institute of Gas Technol-
ogy, 630 F.2d 1217, 1222 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 959 (1981); Loeb, 600
F.2d at 1019.
71. See, e.g., Duffy v. Wheeling Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 738 F.2d 1393, 1395 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 592 (1984); Cuddy v. Carmen, 694 F.2d 853, 858 n.23
(D.C. Cir. 1982); Smith v. University of N.C., 632 F.2d 316, 333 (4th Cir. 1980); Loeb
v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1019 (1st Cir. 1979).
72. See SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 14, at 497; Note, Age Discrimination and
the Disparate Impact Doctrine, 34 STAN. L. REV. 837, 837-38 (1982). But see Massar-
sky v. General Motors Corp., 706 F.2d 111, 120 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 937
(1983) (assuming but not deciding that disparate impact theory is proper, even standing
alone, in ADEA cases); Allison v. Western Union Tel. Co., 680 F.2d 1318 (11th Cir.
1982); Geller v. Markham, 635 F.2d 1027 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 945
(1981).
73. Statistics can be difficult to apply in age discrimination cases, because unlike
race or sex, age discrimination presents a question of degree, so to speak. Cf. Statement
by the President, supra note 3, at 1154 ("The report of the Secretary of Labor showed
that. . . half of all jobs were closed to workers over 55, and one-fourth of all jobs were
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Second, although the courts have imported the McDonnell
Douglas model from Title VII disparate treatment actions to
ADEA disparate treatment claims, there is unmistakable con-
fusion over the traditional fourth step of the McDonnell Doug-
las prima facie case.74 Plainly, the common formulations of
this element are not applicable to reduction in force cases,
where the employer's very purpose is to not replace the invol-
untarily departing plaintiff.75 All courts of appeal agree that
some proof beyond the first three steps of the McDonnell
Douglas formula76 is necessary to establish the prima facie
case and, although this is often overlooked, there is almost
uniform agreement on those first three steps in RIF cases.77
closed to workers over 45."). It is entirely possible that statistics would reveal a much
different impact of a facially neutral policy on 42-year olds, for instance, than on 57-
year olds - although both are equally protected under ADEA. For examples of cases
in which statistical evidence was heavily relied upon, see Geller, 635 F.2d 1027; EEOC
v. Sandia Corp., 639 F.2d 600 (10th Cir. 1980).
74. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
75. The Supreme Court acknowledged immediately in McDonnell Douglas that the
prima facie case set out there would not apply "in every respect to differing factual
situations." Id. See also Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 105 S. Ct. 613, 622
(1985) (assumes, but does not decide, that McDonnell Douglas generally applies to
ADEA actions).
76. As the McDonnell Douglas Court set it out, the prima facie case is comprised of
a showing:
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority;
(ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was
seeking applicants;
(iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and
(iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer con-
tinued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications.
411 U.S. at 802. Steps (i) and (ii) are merely requirements for standing under Title VII,
or ADEA if age is the issue. Step (ii) requires the plaintiff to show only that he was
minimally qualified for the job.
77. Until recently, the Sixth Circuit was loathe to acknowledge that McDonnell
Douglas might be used at all in ADEA cases. Compare Laugesen v. Anaconda Co., 510
F.2d 307, 312 (6th Cir. 1975) (inappropriate to apply automatically) with Ackerman v.
Diamond Shamrock Corp., 670 F.2d 66, 69 (6th Cir. 1982) (applies without discussion);
Blackwell v. Sun Elec. Corp., 696 F.2d 1176, 1179-80 (6th Cir. 1983) (McDonnell Doug-
las elements not exclusive criteria). Agreement on application of the first three steps of
the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case does not mean that courts view McDonnell
Douglas as the only vehicle for presenting a prima facie case. See Blackwell, 696 F.2d at
1179 (citing Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1018 (1st Cir. 1979)); Hedrick v.
Hercules, Inc., 658 F.2d 1088, 1093 (5th Cir. 1981); Stanojev v. Ebasco Serv., Inc., 643
F.2d 914, 920-22 (2d Cir. 1981).
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There is disagreement, however, over exactly what the addi-
tional step should require.78
B. The Williams Case
The Fifth Circuit set the terms of the debate over the
fourth step in the leading case of Williams v. General Motors
Corporation.79 In Williams, nineteen salaried supervisory em-
ployees alleged they had either lost their jobs or been demoted
to hourly wage positions because of age discrimination in a
series of "personnel adjustments" at two General Motors
plants in Georgia.80 Plaintiffs pointed to two allegedly dis-
criminatory policies: a secret rating system for salaried em-
ployees under which older employees consistently received
lower potential ratings, and the insulation of recent college or
General Motors Institute graduates from layoff.
At the close of plaintiffs' case, General Motors moved for
a directed verdict as to fifteen of the plaintiffs on grounds that
each had failed to demonstrate that he was replaced by a per-
son outside the age group protected under ADEA.81 The dis-
trict court took the motion under advisement, but later denied
it in the renewed form of a motion for judgment N.O.V.82
General Motors argued on cross-appeal that the district
court erred in failing to require each plaintiff to show that he
was replaced by a worker outside the protected age group.
Further, General Motors argued that the court erred in refus-
ing to demand proof that each plaintiff either was considered
for a job later filled by a younger person, or was "consciously
refused" consideration for jobs within the scope of his qualifi-
cation.83 Because of these failings, General Motors con-
tended, the plaintiffs did not establish a prima facie case of age
discrimination. The Williams court called this a "penetrating
78. Primarily, the dispute is whether a plaintiff must prove that someone outside
the protected class was favored, or that any younger worker, protected or not, was
favored, or possibly that age was simply a determinative consideration against the plain-
tiff, even if a replacement worker was older. See 9A EMPLOYMENT COORDINATOR
(RIA) EP-38655, at 98,624 (1985); Player, supra note 44, at 643-44 and cases cited
therein.
79. 656 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943 (1982).
80. Id. at 122.
81. Id. at 123.
82. Id. at 124.
83. Id. at 126.
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attack" and "incisive." 4 Significantly, the district court ap-
pears to have discredited the evidence that recent graduates
were effectively shielded from layoff.85
After tipping its hand in this fashion, the Williams court
held that the district court should have required the plaintiffs
to complete their prima facie case by "producing evidence,
circumstantial or direct, from which a factfinder might rea-
sonably conclude that the employer intended to discriminate
in reaching the decision at issue."' 86 Accordingly, the court
reversed the trial court's judgment in favor of the plaintiffs.87
Surely the Fifth Circuit could have improved its analysis
of the prima facie case and its statement of the plaintiff's bur-
den of production in future reduction in force cases. In par-
ticular, Williams clung unfortunately to language in the
earlier Fifth Circuit cases of Price v. Maryland Casualty Co. 88
and Harpring v. Continental Oil Co.,89 strongly suggesting that
''circumstantial or direct" evidence of the employer's intent
requires reference to persons altogether outside the protected
age group. Later Fifth Circuit opinions have also failed to
truly consider this issue, and have continued to assume that
the plaintiff must show that other employees altogether
outside the protected class were treated more favorably.90
84. Id.
85. Id. at 130 n.15.
86. Id. at 129. The Williams court explained further:
Our third requirement simply insists that a plaintiff produce some evidence that
an employer has not treated age neutrally, but has instead discriminated based
upon it. Specifically, the evidence must lead the factfinder reasonably to con-
clude either (1) that defendant consciously refused to consider retaining or relo-
cating a plaintiff because of his age, or (2) defendant regarded age as a negative
factor in such consideration.
Id. at 129-30.
87. Id. at 131.
88. 561 F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 1977).
89. 628 F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 819 (1981).
90. Thornbrough v. Columbus & G.R.R., 760 F.2d 633, 637-38, 644 (5th Cir.
1985); Elliott v. Group Medical & Surgical Serv., 714 F.2d 556, 562 (5th Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2658 (1984); Pace v. Southern Ry. Sys., 530 F. Supp. 381, 385
(N.D. Ga. 1981) (looking to Fifth Circuit law in a demotion case). Professor Player
objects vehemently, and rightly so in our opinion, to this interpretation by the Fifth and
Eleventh Circuits. See Player, supra note 44, at 636-41. To this list we would then add
the Third Circuit. Massarsky v. General Motors Corp., 706 F.2d 111, 118 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 937 (1983). What is worse, these courts treat the terms
"younger" and "outside the protected class" interchangeably. See Thornbrough, 760
F.2d at 633.
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This assumption is wrong. A showing that younger work-
ers, even if they are also within the protected group, were
treated more favorably than the plaintiff should be sufficient to
satisfy the fourth step, under Williams or any formulation.
Thus, evidence that an employer favored a forty-five year old
over a fifty-five year old, largely on the basis of age, should
satisfy the fourth step. 91 Of course, the inferential strength of
the evidence gets weaker as the favored employee's age draws
closer to the disfavored employee's, but this line-drawing
problem on the reasonableness of an inference is not cause to
demand that the referent employee must always be under
forty. 92
Williams also left doubt, at least in the minds of some,
whether this reformulation of the prima facie case in RIF ac-
tions hewed to the role McDonnell Douglas established for the
prima facie case. This ambiguity has resulted in misplaced
criticism. 93 In the only academic evaluation of Williams to
date, Professor Player has taken strong exception to the Wil-
liams restatement of the McDonnell Douglas test in RIF cases,
on the grounds that the Fifth Circuit now requires "direct evi-
dence of age motivation" 94 as part of a plaintiff's prima facie
case. According to Player, by adding this requirement, the
Fifth Circuit has raised the ante so high for plaintiffs that it
has made the prima facie case almost unattainable, and hence
has "virtually abandoned" 95 McDonnell Douglas. He writes:
In the reduction-in-force situations the Fifth and Eleventh
Circuits have thus turned away from the concept that age
motivation can be inferred from the fact that younger per-
sons are retained in their jobs while older plaintiffs, who per-
form similar work, are laid off. These Circuits did not make
clear, however, why an inference of age motivation is weaker
91. The EEOC agrees. 29 C.F.R. § 1625.2(a) (1985). Professor Player is also in
accord. Player, supra note 44, at 640-41.
92. If "outside the protected age group" is the required element of proof, a 41-year
old replaced by a 39-year old has a prima facie case, while a 68-year old replaced by a
41-year old does not. Although this makes line-drawing easier, it also makes the line
drawn very troubling in some instances, if we are truly concerned with eradicating dis-
criminatory misconceptions about older workers.
93. See, e.g., Matthews v. Allis-Chalmers, 769 F.2d 1215, 1221-24 (7th Cir. 1985)
(Flaum, J., concurring); Oxman v. WLS-TV, 609 F. Supp. 1384, 1390 (N.D. Ill. 1985);
Player, supra note 44, at 636-41.
94. Player, supra note 44, at 637 n.75.
95. Id. at 637.
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when the older worker is laid off than when the same worker
is discharged or denied employment that is subsequently of-
fered to a younger applicant. The practical result is that in
many, if not most, layoff situations the plaintiff simply will
be unable to establish a prima facie case because evidence of
actual age animus is rarely available, and unless there is a
significant number of persons laid off any statistical data
may be inherently unreliable.96
This view of Williams has found some recent approval in
judicial quarters,97 but proponents of the Fifth Circuit's ap-
proach seem to outnumber detractors. Most courts of appeal
purport to follow the Williams formulation in RIF cases,
although some state it differently.98 Ironically, those who
have criticized Williams have almost uniformly cited the
Third Circuit's opinion in Massarsky v. General Motors
Corp. 99 as establishing a fairer formulation of the prima facie
case, from a plaintiff's vantage point. 1°° Massarsky, though,
clearly demands proof that "others not in the protected class
were treated more favorably," 10 1 and goes on to cite Williams
approvingly. 10 2
96. Id. at 638-39.
97. See cases cited supra note 93. Indicative of the confusion Williams caused is
the almost simultaneous acceptance and renunciation of that opinion by district courts
within the Seventh Circuit. Compare Oxman, 609 F. Supp. at 1390, with Roe v. Inter-
national Harvester Co., 604 F. Supp. 57, 65 (N.D. Ind. 1984). That split carried over to
the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Matthews.
98. See, eg., Holley v. Sanyo Mfg., Inc., 771 F.2d 1161, 1166 (8th Cir. 1985); Mat-
thews v. Allis-Chalmers, 769 F.2d 1215, 1217 (7th Cir. 1985); LaGrant v. Gulf& West-
ern Mfg. Co., Inc., 748 F.2d 1087, 1090-91 (6th Cir. 1984); Duffy v. Wheeling
Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 738 F.2d 1393, 1395 n.3 (3d Cir. 1984); EEOC v. Western Elec.
Co., Inc., 713 F.2d 1011, 1015 (4th Cir. 1983); Allison v. Western Union Tel. Co., 680
F.2d 1318, 1321 (11th Cir. 1982); Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1018 (Ist Cir.
1979) (endorsing reasoning very similar to that in Williams). The District of Columbia
Circuit used a similar standard in Coburn v. Pan Am. World Airways, 711 F.2d 339,
343 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 994 (1983).
99. 706 F.2d 111 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 937 (1983).
100. Matthews, 769 F.2d at 1224; Oxman, 609 F. Supp. at 1390. Massarsky was
decided after Professor Player wrote his article, Player, supra note 44. Arguably he
would have objected to that case as requiring reference to persons outside the protected
age group, which seems to be more than the Third Circuit formerly required. See
Smithers v. Bailar, 629 F.2d 892, 895 (3d Cir. 1980).
101. Massarsky, 706 F.2d at 118 (emphasis added).
102. Id. at 118 n.13.
MODERN REDUCTION IN FORCE
In fact, Williams has probably been wrongly maligned.
Before defending what we think10 3 the Fifth Circuit meant in
Williams, it is helpful to step back and consider what value, if
any, the tripartite, burden-shifting approach of McDonnell
Douglas has in discrimination cases, and what a standard for
the prima facie case should demand of a plaintiff.
C. Evaluating the Prima Facie Case After a RIF
In the context of a trial, McDonnell Douglas looks, and is,
artificial and unrealistic. The plaintiff will offer what evidence
he has, most of which in the end must go to the question of
pretext, and then he will rest. The defendant will move for a
directed verdict. The judge will, in the ordinary case, take the
motion under advisement and the defendant will then attempt
to persuade the factfinder that age had nothing to do with the
employment decision. Although the plaintiff may indeed offer
rebuttal evidence, the liability phase of an age discrimination
trial does not magically take on a new evidentiary format be-
cause of McDonnell Douglas.
In the context of pretrial maneuvering and discovery,
however, the scheme McDonnell Douglas envisions is quite
useful. Specifically, it provides the structure for a summary
judgment motion by isolating a relatively discrete group of is-
sues - the prima facie case - upon which the plaintiff must
have garnered some favorable evidence through discovery, at
peril of summary judgment in the employer's favor. The Mc-
Donnell Douglas prima facie case also serves as a handy yard-
stick by which employers and plaintiffs alike can assess the
wisdom of settling out of court. A defendant employer who
gauges a plaintiff able to establish a prima facie case, suggest
pretext, and thus reach a jury, may well decide that discretion
dictates serious settlement negotiations.
If the McDonnell Douglas concept of a prima facie case is
valuable as a framework for evaluating a settlement proposal
or summary judgment motion, the next question is what these
103. The ambiguity of the discussion in Williams is reason enough for mild criti-
cism, but the Fifth Circuit has recently done much to elucidate the fourth step an-
nounced in Williams. See Thornbrough, 760 F.2d at 642-44. We remain critical of the
Fifth Circuit's insistence that a plaintiff prove that workers outside the protected class
were favored. See discussion supra notes 86-102.
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special settings demand of the actual elements of the prima
facie case. The ideal formulation of a prima facie disparate
treatment case would approach two related objectives that are
deceptively immodest. A perfect prima facie standard would
first permit every meritorious case to go forward to trial, and
second, would winnow out every case in which the plaintiff
has not been adversely treated by an employer for reasons pro-
scribed by the ADEA.
Such a perfect prima facie standard is of course unattaina-
ble in the real world. At best, the legal system can merely
hope to approximate both objectives. At the summary judg-
ment stage, our system's normative decision to err on the side
of the nonmoving party works in favor of age discrimination
plaintiffs, and this is surely in keeping with the liberal purpose
of the ADEA. In this vein, it is important to note that plain-
tiffs bear a lesser burden of production at the summary judg-
ment stage than at trial. To reach a jury, the plaintiff must
prove his prima facie case by a preponderance of the evidence
and offer evidence to contest a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason. To survive summary judgment, the plaintiff need only
demonstrate a genuine dispute of material fact with respect to
each step of the prima facie case.1°4
The two aspects of the McDonnell Douglas test that estab-
lish standing under the ADEA are a sensible starting point for
the prima facie case. A plaintiff must show first that he is in
the protected class and, second, that he was adversely affected
by some action of the employer,10 5 or he clearly cannot claim
refuge in the ADEA, regardless of his employer's inner
motives.
The third step of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case,
proof of qualification for the job, warrants brief reexamination
in the RIF context. In a RIF case, the employer has by defini-
tion eliminated jobs, and then has necessarily made adjust-
ments affecting the workers who held those positions. ADEA
104. See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53
(1981); Thornbrough v. Columbus & G.R.R., 760 F.2d 633, 641 n.8 (3d Cir. 1985).
105. The term "employer" is used throughout the case law and ADEA, but 29
U.S.C. § 623(c) (1982), an ideological descendant of the Taft-Hartley Act, makes clear
that the strictures of ADEA apply as well as to labor organizations.
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requires only that the employer not discriminate against pro-
tected employees in making those adjustments.
Thus it is logically of no moment that the complaining em-
ployee was qualified for the job he used to have. What mat-
ters is that he was qualified for a function that remained
available in the organization.1 0 6 This is the proper under-
standing of the qualification plank of a plaintiff's prima facie
case in an ADEA reduction in force case and, contrary to
Professor Player's argument, is the reason that the inference
of age discrimination is weaker when a protected worker loses
his job in a RIF, without more, than when a younger worker
is selected after an older worker is fired.
If we assume that employers do not permanently eliminate
integral job functions within their businesses simply for the
sake of ridding themselves of old employees, then summary
judgment is appropriate in RIF cases where the plaintiff can-
not demonstrate that he was qualified for duties remaining in
the organization. Where the function has been eliminated, re-
quiring an employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscrimina-
tory reason for terminating an employee who performed that
function, but could perform no other, would be to tacitly shift
the burden of demonstrating the employee's (lack of) qualifi-
cation to the employer. The protected worker who is qualified
for but one function in his employer's organization has no age
discrimination claim when the job itself - the duty, as op-
posed to just the person performing it - is eliminated. 0 7
Conversely, a showing that the plaintiff was qualified for a
job remaining in the workplace, which ordinarily will be easily
made, cannot fairly complete the prima facie case. If the
prima facie case were limited to three steps in RIF actions, a
forty-five year old foreman who was laid off and could demon-
strate competence to perform the work he supervised would
have established that it was presumptively illegal to terminate
106. Cf. Matthews v. Allis-Chalmers, 769 F.2d 1215, 1224 n.1 (7th Cir. 1985)
(Flaum, J., concurring) (requirement that some job must actually have been available at
the time of the plaintiffs discharge).
107. Cf. Mizrany v. Texas Rehabilitation Comm'n, 522 F. Supp. 611, 615-16 (S.D.
Tex. 1981) (a pre- Williams RIF case that required no fourth step showing, but found
only that the plaintiff was qualified for the job she held, which was eliminated for legiti-
mate reasons).
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him.10 8 Such a showing would not suffice to meet the prima
facie standard in a discharge case, 10 9 and should no more suf-
fice in a RIF case, where the employer's motives for termina-
tion probably have, if anything, less to do with the particular
employee affected. The practical effect of truncating the
prima facie case after the third step would be to make it nearly
impossible for an employer to obtain summary judgment in a
RIF case, assuming that a plaintiff will ordinarily be able to
prove that he could have performed some other function.
Again, courts appear to agree that something more is required
to establish a prima facie case arising from a reduction in
force. 110
D. Williams Reaffirmed
Returning then to Williams, the fourth step we understand
that court to propose is appropriately adaptable and contex-
tual. The RIF plaintiff is instructed to present "some evi-
dence" - direct, statistical or otherwise circumstantial 11 -
from which a factfinder might reasonably conclude the em-
ployer discriminated on the basis of age in reducing its
workforce.112
Far from imposing a more onerous burden of proof on the
plaintiff than McDonnell Douglas, the fourth step in Williams
can and should be interpreted to allow a broad range of evi-
dence, as the context of the particular reduction in force may
suggest. This adaptable final step comes with a reminder of
the very purpose of the prima facie case under McDonnell
Douglas, which is to raise a reasonable inference of discrimi-
nation. 113 The contextual fourth step of Williams should not
108. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252-54, 254 n.7.
109. See, e.g., Player, supra note 44, at 635-36.
110. See, e.g., EEOC v. Western Elec. Co., 713 F.2d 1011, 1015 (4th Cir. 1983);
LaGrant v. Gulf W. Mfg. Co., 748 F.2d 1087, 1090 (6th Cir. 1984); Matthews v. Allis-
Chalmers, 769 F.2d 1215, 1221 (7th Cir. 1985) (Flaum, J., concurring).
11. It is patently incorrect to say, as Professor Player does, supra note 44, at 638
n.75, that the Williams prima facie case requires direct evidence of age motivation. See
Williams v. General Motors Corp., 656 F.2d 120, 129 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 943 (1982).
112. Williams, 656 F.2d at 129-30.
113. Furnco Constr. Corp v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978); Texas Dep't of
Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981). The Fifth Circuit has re-
cently explained that the fourth step of the Williams prima facie case is very flexible
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be read to require evidence that would allow a conclusion of
age discrimination standing alone. Rather, the fourth and last
step should be seen as exactly that: some evidence that will
reasonably clinch plaintiff's entitlement to hear the em-
ployer's evidence of a legitimate reason for its employment
decision.
Having satisfied the first three steps of his prima facie case,
the plaintiff is asked to probe the context of his adverse treat-
ment for some additional evidence that will confirm the rea-
sonableness of a mandatory presumption that the employer
discriminated on the basis of age, unless that evidence is ex-
plained by the employer. 14 Assuming he can also contest any
proffered legitimate reason, this commends a trial for any
plaintiff who has some evidence which, when considered along
with his protected status, harm incurred and qualification for
a remaining job, would reasonably warrant a presumption of
discrimination. If such a reading of Williams reflects the Fifth
Circuit's intent, then this contextual fourth step is no greater
burden on the plaintiff than the traditional prima facie
showing.
The best contextual evidence in RIF cases would often be
placement or retention of a younger person in a remaining job
for which the plaintiff was qualified, although this is not true
where an employer has merely thinned the ranks of a large job
category and older workers are proportionately represented
among the RIF survivors. Williams should be read to ac-
knowledge, in any case, that other evidence, as the circum-
stances may suggest, would serve as well for a fourth step
showing. There is a trade-off in this flexibility, of course; in
the absence of having the fourth step spelled out, judges must
decide what type of evidence rises to the level of sealing a rea-
sonable presumption. However, courts ought to be guided in
this determination by the fourth step showing permitted in
other situations, and by the fact that the Supreme Court has
never meant to limit a prima facie case in any set of circum-
indeed in the evidence it will allow to raise this reasonable inference. Thornbrough, 760
F.2d at 642-44.
114. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254 n.7.
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stances to a rigid formula. 1 5 Under this interpretation of Wil-
liams, a prima facie showing is most nearly accessible to all
plaintiffs with meritorious claims, and at the same time is fore-
closed to as many plaintiffs with nonmeritorious claims as
possible in an imperfect legal system.
V. CONCLUSION
The federal courts have had varying degrees of success in
applying the traditional ADEA disparate treatment analysis
to reduction in force cases. Although not a model of clarity,
the Fifth Circuit's approach in Williams to formulating a
prima facie case of age discrimination in the RIF context
lends both negative and positive guidance to other courts.
The Fifth Circuit wrongly continued to insist that a plaintiff
must show that persons outside the protected group were
treated more favorably. A showing that a younger employee,
even one within the protected age group, was treated more
favorably should suffice.
However, the balance of the Williams formulation of the
fourth element of a prima facie case of age discrimination in
the RIF context has merit. The Williams court provided a
flexible and contextual rendering of the fourth step. A plain-
tiff who presents some other evidence, gleaned from the cir-
cumstances of his discharge, will have raised an inference of
age discrimination sufficient to justify imposing upon the em-
ployer the burden of articulating a legitimate, nondiscrimina-
tory reason for selecting the plaintiff in reducing its work
force. To require less of the plaintiff would allow more non-
meritorious claims to proceed to trial than necessary, even in
an imperfect legal system, and would needlessly burden em-
ployers seeking to adjust to changing economic times through
admittedly painful reductions in force.
115. Id. at 253 n.0, Furnco Consir, Corp.. 438 U.S. at 577 (McDonnell Douglas was
'never intended to be rigid, mechanized, or ritualistic"); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 n.13 (1973).
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